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The Legalization of 
Prison Discipline in Canada 
Michael Mandel 
Introduction 
As recently as 1968, a prominent Canadian court could write with 
complete confidence and unanimity that: 
the passing of a sentence upon a convicted criminal extinguishes, for 
the period of his lawful confinement, all his rights to liberty and to 
the personal possession of property within the institution in which he 
is confined, save to the extent, if any, that those rights are expressly 
preserved by the Penitentiary Act (R. v. Institutional Head of Beaver 
Creek Correctional Camp, ex parte McCaud [1969], 1 C.C.C. 371, 
377, Ontario Court of Appeal). 
By the end of the next decade, an even more prominent court would 
subscribe with equal confidence and unanimity to the precise opposite 
proposition that "a person confined to prison retains all of his civil rights, 
other than those expressly or impliedly taken from him by law" (Solosky v. 
The Queen [1979], 50 C.C.C. [2d] 495, per Dickson, J., now CJ.C, for the 
Supreme Court of Canada). 
The intervening 11 years witnessed first a gradual and then precipitous 
overthrow of a firm judicial principle 
? the non-justifiability of complaints 
from prisoners of abuse of power by prison and parole authorities 
? that had 
been inherited from England and is as old as the penitentiary system itself. The 
brief period since 1979 has seen, with the entrenchment of a constitutional 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, such an acceleration in the judicial 
willingness to adjudicate prisoners' claims that even the "express or implied 
taking away of rights by law" is no longer any bar. In fact, the legal status of 
prisoners has undergone a radical transformation. 
Canada lagged some 15 years behind U.S. developments dating from the 
abandonment of the "hands off doctrine in the mid-1960s, first with respect 
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to civil rights issues (Cooper v. Pate 378 U.S. 546 [1964]; Lee v. Washington 
390 U.S. 333 [1968]); then jail house lawyers (Johnson v. Avery 393 U.S. 483 
[1969]); limited due process in parole (Morrisey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471 
[1972]), and disciplinary hearings (Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539 [1974]) 
to the massive intervention of the cruel and unusual punishment cases, such as 
Holt v. Sarver 309 F. Supp. 360 (1970), Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678, Pugh v. 
Locke 406 F. Supp. 318; Graddick v. Newman 102 S.Ct. 4 (1981). 
By the mid-1970s, the limitations on the willingness of U.S. courts to 
involve themselves in prison administration were, however, becoming 
apparent, with such decisions as Pell v. Procunier 94 S.C. 2800 (1974) and 
Saxbe v. Washington Post 94 S.Ct. 281 (1974), upholding limitations on 
visiting rights; Baxter v. Palmigiano (California) 425 U.S. 308 (1974) refusing 
to apply right to counsel, full cross-examination rights, and self-incrimination 
protections to disciplinary proceedings; Meachum v. Fano (Massachusetts) 
427 U.S. 215 (1976) and Montanye v. Haymes (New York) 427 U.S. 236 
(1976), refusing to apply due process requirements to disciplinary transfers; 
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union 433 U.S. 119 (1977) 
upholding regulations forbidding unions; Greenholtz v. Inmates of the 
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex 442 U.S. 1 (1979) and Connecticut 
Board of Pardons v. Dumschat 101 S.Ct. 2460 (1981) No. 2, holding due 
process in parole granting conditional on a statutory right to parole; Bell v. 
Wolfish 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979), limiting applicability of cruel and unusual 
punishment to prison conditions as they were on due process indiscipline; 
Hewitt v. Helms 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983) and Hudson v. Palmer 104 S.Ct. 2194 
(1984), doing the same for due process, indiscipline, and search and seizure in 
prison respectively. 
These developments were well known to Canadian lawyers and legal 
academics who had been advocating them for Canada since the beginning of 
the decade (Judson and Laidlaw, 1971; Bowie, 1971; Kaiser, 1971; Solicitor 
General of Canada, 1972: 53; Price, 1974; Jackson, 1974). The influential 
dissent of Chief Justice Laskin in the parole case Mitchell v. The Queen 
([1975], 24 C.C.C. [2d] 241) cited U.S. authority, as did the most recent in a 
130 year-long series of official investigations of abuses in the penal system, 
which mainly distinguished itself from other exercises by coming out squarely 
in favor of judicial review as an all-purpose remedy (Canada, House of 
Commons, 1977: Chapter VII). 
Canadian lawyers generally paid much attention to the activity of Ameri? 
can courts from the late 1940s on. The movement for a constitutionally 
entrenched Charter of Rights was inspired by it (O'Halloran, 1948; Glasbeek 
and Mandel, 1984) and this movement's first fruit, the Canadian Bill of Rights 
introduced in 1960, was expressly modeled on the American Bill of Rights. 
Furthermore, the postwar period saw the ever increasing influence on the 
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world of American culture and institutions. This was especially so in Canada 
with the explosion of U.S. direct investment (as opposed to portfolio 
investment and to direct investment from any other source, including the 
U.K.), which led to the establishment of U.S. branch plants as the dominant 
forces in Canadian manufacturing and resource extraction (Clement, 1975: 
112-116). The influence of television, mostly American and entirely a post? 
war phenomenon, should also not be discounted. Any attempt to understand 
developments in Canadian prison law must consequently start by trying to 
understand developments in the United States. 
Most U.S. students of the prisoners' rights revolution attribute great 
explanatory significance to the political and social ferment of the 1960s. 
According to Ronald Berkman (1979: 40), "the changing political mood of the 
sixties, including the Civil Rights Movement, the Vietnam War, and the 
emergence of ethnic and national movements played a decisive role." The 
prison was caught up in this ferment and politicized, not in the sense of being 
a political issue, which it had always been, but in the sense that crime and 
punishment in general and prisons in particular were seen as the products of 
conflicts of power, as coextensive with other political issues, especially the 
issue of racism. This was largely the result of an influx of highly politicized 
prisoners, including draft resisters, civil rights workers, and Black Muslims, 
who regarded their imprisonment in political terms and who, as a 
consequence, not only brought their own struggles into the prison but who 
were also highly motivated and equipped to struggle against the 
authoritarianism of the prison itself. For example, Berkman notes a change in 
the demands issuing out of prison riots in the 1950s, which were mostly 
concerned with basic living conditions and those of the 1960s, which were 
political and even class based. 
Black Muslims were especially effective in bringing their religious form of 
resistance to racism into the prison and ininitiating a "new morality" of "group 
time" (Jacobs, 1980: 435). Naturally, this brought the Muslims into conflict 
with prison authorities; since they were able to articulate their demands in 
terms of the civil rights movement, already accepted as legitimate by the 
courts, and of the well-accepted precepts of religious freedom, they achieved 
the first prisoner litigation successes. This had a distinct influence on other 
prisoners. Also influential were the Warren court reforms of criminal 
procedure which resulted in prisoners being released from prison for defects in 
their trial procedures which prompted many prisoners to review their own 
trials and litigate procedural defects in them. 
Organizations and individuals outside prisons also came to regard prisons 
in a different light: 
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The eroding legitimacy of the state and the politicizing of many seg? 
ments of the population that were previously powerless and apolitical 
(college students, the poor, and racial or cultural minorities)...had a 
huge impact upon the prisons. These groups influence[d] each other 
in a spiral of increasing politicization of areas of life previously 
thought to be beyond the realm of political analysis and action 
(Bowker, quoted in Huff, 1980: 56-57). 
The American Left "saw prisoners as victims of capitalist and racial 
oppression" (Berkman, 1979: 57): 
The Left's interest in the prisoners' movement gave impetus to the 
struggle inside. Outside groups engaged in propaganda and support 
activities in the form of defense committees for prisoners facing legal 
action and direct political protest activity at the prison and 
Department of Corrections. The movement inside felt less isolated. 
Prisoners felt that their political activity had strong links to the 
struggles of other groups in the community. These perceived links 
gave politically active prisoners new inspiration to close the divisions 
in the inmate body. 
Perspectives on Prisoners' Rights 
The question remains, however, why this politicization of prisons should 
issue in a legal revolution, why prisoners' political claims came to be 
interpreted and accepted in legal terms. Legal remedies did become more and 
more available and the attitudes of judges and lawyers changed, but these 
changes themselves need explanation. One explanation has been to locate the 
prisoners' rights movement in the "dynamics of mass society," a 
developmental theory which argues that "the predominant social and 
institutional norms and values in a mass society tend to be extended to include 
previously marginal groups" (Huff, 1980: 51). A leading U.S. proponent of 
this view is James B. Jacobs, who argues that it is "fundamental to the 
realization of mass society" that "rights of citizenship" be extended to 
"heretofore marginal groups like racial minorities, the poor, and the 
incarcerated" (Jacobs, 1977: 6): 
The prisoners' rights movement must be understood in the context of 
a "fundamental democratization" which has transformed American 
society since World War II, and particularly since 1960. Starting with 
the black civil rights movement in the mid-1950s, one marginal group 
after another ? blacks, poor people, welfare mothers, mental 
patients, women, children, aliens, gays, and the handicapped 
? has 
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pressed for admission into the societal mainstream. While each group 
has its own history and a special character, the general trend has been 
to extend citizenship rights to a greater proportion of the total 
population by recognizing the existence and legitimacy of group 
grievances. 
Prisoners, a majority of whom are now black and poor, have identi? 
fied themselves and their struggle with other "victimized minorities," 
and pressed their claims with vigor and not a little moral indignation. 
Various segments of the free society linked the prisoners' cause to the 
plight of other powerless groups. To a considerable extent the legal 
system, especially the federal district courts, accepted the legitimacy 
of prisoners' claims (Jacobs, 1980: 429-470; 432). 
Jacobs argues that judicial intervention has had a "great impact" and has 
wrought "enormous changes" in the American prison system (1980: 452^453). 
In opening up a public forum for grievances, says Jacobs, the courts at once 
destroyed the absolute power of the custodians and the isolation of the 
prisoners. Each decision in favor of the prisoners had great symbolic 
importance due to the "psychological impact" of court rhetoric in publicly 
vindicating prisoners and repudiating the administration, which gave power to 
the movement and demoralized its opposition. State legislatures have not only 
complied with, but gone beyond court mandated changes (Ibid.: 446). Even 
the recent reverses in the Supreme Court have not greatly affected the gains 
made through earlier litigation because lower courts remain active in the 
mostly routine enforcement of well-established rights and even oppose the 
conservative trends recently emanating from the higher courts. 
Overall, Jacobs hypothesizes that the prisoners' rights movement has 
transformed the prison into an institution which must document, rationalize, 
and explain its actions, and this, in turn, has produced a new generation of 
administrators who are better educated and less arbitrary. Although litigation 
has had some concrete effects, such as in procedural protections, Jacobs 
attributes primary significance to the heightened public awareness of prison 
conditions, given that litigation is reported in the mass media ("the peaceful 
equivalent of a riot"), and the courts are used by progressive administrators as 
a scapegoat for having to improve correctional programs. Prison welfare 
benefits such as therapists, schooling, medical services, religious materials, 
books, grievance mechanisms, reduced censorship, less brutal punishment, 
more healthful conditions and less boredom are legitimized by litigation.1 To 
the extent that they also result from the politicization of prisoners and the 
heightening of their expectations, this too can be attributed to court victory, as 
can the demoralization of prison staff who become more insecure both legally 
and morally in their dealings with inmates. Indeed, Jacobs cites the opposition 
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of administrators to court involvement as evidence of its effectiveness. Jacobs 
concludes that though prisoners are far from being established as "citizens 
behind bars," nevertheless litigation has gone a long way in "liberating 
prisoners from being slaves of the state" (Ibid.: 444). 
Jim Thomas (1984) gives a more Marxist interpretation of the mass society 
theory by locating litigation by marginal groups in a trend in the monopoly 
phase of late capitalism towards the proliferation of legal rights through their 
extension to corporations and the increasing activity of the state through law. 
Thomas' rather idealistic view is that this litigation came about because these 
increased rights of corporations and the state "implied obligations in that 
[these] legal subjects became potential targets for litigation, thus creating a 
new avenue for resolving social conflict" (Ibid.: 150). On the question of the 
effect of litigation, Thomas is even more sanguine than Jacobs, arguing that in 
addition to the concrete effects of successful litigation in which "the repressive 
power of the state is directly subverted" (Ibid.: 161) there are even more 
important ideological "desubordination" effects as court actions "challenge the 
power, authority, and even legitimacy of the control system. Even when a 
particular judicial decision is unsuccessful, the act of resistance itself may 
have an impact on state power-apparatus" (Ibid.: 164). 
This rather wild enthusiasm for court-initiated prison reform is not 
universally shared by commentators. Some testify to how difficult it is to 
obtain compliance with court-mandated reform (Bronstein, 1980: 40-41). Not 
everyone agrees with this, however, and many observers seem to think that 
there has been general, if grudging and slow, compliance with the letter, if not 
the spirit, of court-mandated reforms (Jacobs, 1977; Smith and Fried, 1974: 
87-101). 
The deeper issue is the meaning and effect of these reforms, even when 
they are implemented. With respect to the disciplinary process, it has 
frequently been observed that despite procedural, due process-type reforms, 
the actual rate and level of punishment has remained unchanged (Smith and 
Fried, 1974: 90; Berkman, 1979: 149). This is not surprising. It is highly 
implausible that the courts intended by their procedural reforms a 
transformation in the power structure of the prison. Motivation aside, decision 
making power, after the fair procedures have been put in place, always 
remains with the administration. Even to the extent that procedural reforms 
tend to rationalize the actual decisions themselves, this only means that the 
administration is restricted to express the legitimate interests of state (as 
opposed to purely personal interests), and these interests are always to exclude 
the independent interests of prisoners. That deterrence, security, and even 
rehabilitation are always seen from the state's point of view has in any event 
been ensured by the "wide-ranging deference" which the courts have 
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consistently afforded administrators with respect to substantive, if not 
procedural, decisions. 
One Canadian commentator has questioned the whole premise of the legal 
due process revolution in prisons, which was based on the idea, most 
ambitiously formulated 
? and consistently refused by the courts 
? as 
affording prisoners in disciplinary proceedings the same rights as those that 
are available to accused persons in the "ordinary criminal process." Tammy 
Landau, drawing on the work of Ericson and Baranek (1982), has noted that 
introducing due process into the prison on the ordinary court model could only 
reproduce the dependency and oppression of the ordinary criminal process 
where: 
the accused is...better construed as a dependent rather than a defen? 
dant... with few rights or opportunities to influence the chain of 
events leading to a verdict of guilt in the vast majority of cases 
(Landau,1984:159). 
Landau (1984: 151) also argues that: 
Bringing the "rule of law" into prisons through a complex system of 
laws and procedural due process can only contribute to the problem 
that purports to address: a system of rules and regulations which 
permits the unbridled yet legitimate discretionary powers of a third 
party. 
On the other hand, when we contemplate the prelitigation prison system, it 
is hard to then belittle the reforms which have been more or less secured or to 
deny that they came about primarily through the impetus of the courts. 
Exposing the prison to outside scrutiny deters the worst excesses of brutality 
and arbitrary action, bringing the prison nearly into conformity with juridical 
norms of due process and equality before the law irrespective of race, sex, 
geographical location, etc. Other things being equal, the legalized prison 
should be a better prison. But are other things equal? What, in other words, is 
the relationship between law and discipline in this context? 
Huff (1980: 51) noted the limited nature of "mass society"-type advances 
("there is no claim that prisoners, the poor, and racial minorities are becoming 
middle class in a social economic sense"), but this did not seem to seriously 
diminish his enthusiasm for such developments. Berkman's analysis suggests 
that the quest for "mass society" rights has really diverted claimants from their 
more fundamental claims. He argues that the early successes of the Civil 
Rights Movement in attracting prisoners to its banner were partly owing to the 
misleading promises of legality: 
86 Mandel 
The central demand of the Civil Rights Movement was the demand to 
extend constitutional rights to afford blacks the same constitutional 
status afforded whites. Certainly the charismatic leadership of the 
movement and the abundance of media attention that it drew 
enhanced its appeal. The Civil Rights Movement tended to draw a 
close correlation among rights, freedom, and justice. Freedom and 
justice were seen as almost mechanical outputs of a system of citi? 
zenship rights. This tendency to see the accumulation and protection 
of democratic rights as springboards to freedom and justice had pro? 
found effects on black consciousness (Berkman, 1979: 100-101). 
As we have seen, Landau's critique went even further in arguing that legal 
rights "legitimate" oppression, that is, enhance its acceptability and thereby 
guarantee its continued or even expanded reproduction. 
Legalization of Politics 
But this still leaves a lot to be explained. Why does legitimation, which 
must always exist in one form or another, now take this legal form? What are 
the specific implications of it doing so? To answer these questions, we must 
put the developments in prisoners' legal rights in a wider context, namely 
what Harry Glasbeek and I have called the "legalization of politics." We use 
this term to designate a trend, of which the enactment of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms is part, toward the increasing prominence of courts in 
the resolution of political controversy of all sorts. 
We have tried to explain and evaluate this trend by reference to the 
specific accumulation and legitimation problems, noted by several authors 
(e.g., O'Connor, 1973; Habermas, 1975; Wood, 1981), which confront 
advanced capitalist countries in our epoch. These stem from the increasing 
politicization of the accumulation process ("the economy") through increasing 
state intervention. The "public" and "private" spheres become "re-coupled." 
This occurs at the same time as capitalist relations of production become 
increasingly dysfunctional, that is, as they increasingly stand between people 
and their production and consumption needs and capabilities. This is no 
coincidence; it is precisely to solve these dysfunctions that the state becomes 
more and more involved in the economy. This means that increasing recourse 
must be made to forms of legitimation (i.e., in ways of defending a status quo 
of grossly unequal social power) that are abstract in the sense that they do not 
depend on meeting people's concrete needs (unlike the old efficiency 
legitimations), and that avoid genuine participatory democracy, even in the 
public sphere, which in the context of state involvement in the economy might 
endanger the freedom to accumulate. 
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It is here that the legal system comes in, not only because of the reliability 
of the courts as protectors of the social status quo, which makes litigation a 
safe alternative to genuine democracy, but also because of the form of legal 
discourse by which the legal profession justifies both the status quo and its 
role in defending it. We argue that legalized (juridical) discourse even in late 
capitalism is legitimation of a characteristically abstract type which suppresses 
the historical and material (class) aspects of the conflicts of interest with 
which it deals, by transforming them into questions of "principle" concerning 
the rights of free-willing legal subjects. As contrasted with other political 
institutions, courts are structurally constrained to prefer arguments of a 
deontological sort to utilitarian arguments, rights to goods, principles to 
policies, etc. Their increasing prominence in the resolution of political 
controversy signifies a corresponding advance for their particular form of 
political argument. 
Legalized politics is simulated politics, intended 
? like other forms of 
capitalist politics 
? to domesticate class struggle, but in a way better suited to 
the problems of late capitalism than other forms of politics. Thus, more and 
more political power struggles find their way into the courts to be scrutinized 
according to their conformity with judicial ideals, which, being based on equal 
legal subjecthood, leave class relations untouched. This does not mean that 
they are irrelevant. Equal legal citizenship can be a matter of great importance 
to those excluded from it. On the other hand, by ignoring class-based social 
power, equal legal citizenship not only reinforces the social status quo, but 
may also even aggravate it as, for example, when corporations are treated as if 
they were simply individuals and given rights (Hunter v. Southam [1984], 11 
D.L.R. [4th] 641, Supreme Court of Canada). In any event, political 
development under legalized politics tends to be characterized by these 
juridical values and limited by its conformity with these values, because 
nothing that fails to conform to them can be legitimate, and this is so whether 
the development occurs through the courts or outside of them. The legalization 
of various realms of life tends thus to become at once a substitute for 
fundamental change and an independent reinforcement of the status quo. 
In Canada there were specific local and immediate goals which were pre? 
eminent in the whole process of setting this mechanism in place. This includes 
the protection of minority language rights (especially English rights in 
Quebec), to prevent the centrifugal forces working against the Canadian union. 
The general trend to legalized politics is of unquestionable importance as the 
means to this difficult specific end. Furthermore, though the economic and 
cultural domination exercised by the United States over Canada since the war 
has obviously determined the form and pacing of the legalization of Canadian 
politics, it is apparently a postwar phenomenon to be found throughout the 
capitalist world in common and civil law jurisdictions alike. Thus, instead of a 
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straightforward adoption of U.S. prison law, Canadian prison law 
developments, though no doubt influenced by the U.S. courts, is part of a gen? 
eral political-legal trend, most pronounced in the U.S., but meeting local 
Canadian needs and shaped by local legitimation exigencies. This can explain, 
for example, why in adopting the general approach of the U.S. courts, 
Canadian courts feel not only free, but also often compelled, to go their own 
way on specific matters. 
The idea of the legalization of politics seems more adequate than that of 
"mass society" to the task of explaining and evaluating the increasing 
willingness of courts to adjudicate prisoner claims. The attitude of Canadian 
courts to prison issues has certainly undergone enormous changes in the past 
decade. In this sense, there has been something of a legal revolution. Prison 
administrators and parole boards are increasingly called upon to justify to the 
courts what they do to prisoners. And even the existence of statutory 
authorization is no longer an adequate justification with the advent of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Statutes themselves and the 
actions and policies of administrators must now pass muster with legal values. 
However, the precise nature of these legal values has great implications. 
Because they are entirely formal, having to do either with the requirements of 
administrative rationality, such as procedural requirements quite rigorously 
insisted upon by Canadian Courts, or with matters of abstract citizenship such 
as the right to vote (on which there are many contradictory judicial 
pronouncements, but consistent governmental expansion of the right), they 
leave the substance of power relations untouched. At most, they affect the 
"personal" aspect of power by requiring it to be shared between administrators 
and courts. At most, they interfere with the abuse of power but not with its 
exercise or existence as an objective or structural relation between prisoners 
and the state. Consequently, they cannot entail an enhancement of status for 
prisoners as a class, even though individuals may benefit from time to time 
from jurisdictional disputes between the power-sharers. Although claims to 
procedural due process in the form of fair hearings (including the right to 
counsel, and no double jeopardy), have met with general success in realms 
such as parole, temporary absence, prison discipline, transfer, and 
administrative dissociation, all claims to substantive limitations on the 
exercise of the same powers have failed. 
So little, in fact, do legal values entail limitations on substantive power, 
that the legalization of prison discipline has occurred at the same time as a 
great expansion in the substantive disciplinary power of "the system." This 
includes, of course, an explosion in the sheer number of persons under control 
in prison, on parole or mandatory supervision;2 the increasing length of 
individual prison sentences, the expansion in the powers and activities of 
parole boards since the late 1950s, the proliferation of types of institutions 
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from maximum to minimum security, and the easy transfer between institu? 
tions across the country and across jurisdictional boundaries; the proliferation 
of different forms of imprisonment, such as the finely calibrated Special 
Handling Unit system, the various temporary absence systems, and the many 
other "privileges" which can make prison very much like life outside for some 
prisoners and very much like life in hell for others. Thus, the system has 
simultaneously experienced legalization and a great expansion in its flexibility 
to discipline an ever larger population. This naturally raises the question of 
whether the relation of court intervention to the expansion of power is more 
than merely coincidental. 
In his masterful description of 18th century English criminal law, Douglas 
Hay (1975) has shown how solicitude of absurd proportions to the formal 
procedural rights of accused persons helped to legitimate a system of brutal 
class-based repression. This is not to argue that procedural guarantees should 
be dismissed as a sham. However, it is a grave error to celebrate them in 
abstraction from the system of power in which they are situated. If this error is 
nevertheless easy to make 
? it has arguably been made by Hay's colleague 
E.P. Thompson 
? it is because the democratic ideals, which appeal to us in 
the notion of the "rule of law," are apt to be confused with a juridical "rule of 
law" in which procedural guarantees are undermined by a discretionary system 
wholly in the hands of the legal profession (Thompson, 1975; Mandel, 1985). 
The appeal of the "rule of law" resides in the real limitations on official 
power implied by it, whether this power is administrative or judicial. By 
contrast, courts administering the Canadian prison system operate almost 
completely without popular restraint. The Charter of Rights hardly pretends to 
guide their power in matters other than language rights, and the only sense in 
which the legislative standards governing prisons could be said to do so is in 
the wide powers they grant to prison administrators. The standards governing 
parole, mandatory supervision, earned remission, temporary absences, 
transfers between institutions, administrative segregation, visiting rights, and 
correspondence are all inscribed in legislation in unlimited discretionary 
terms. 
It is this system of power, with at most token popular supervision (through 
Citizens' Advisory Committees, grievance procedures, Correctional 
Investigators, ombudspersons, etc., none of whom have any powers of 
restraint), which Canadian courts have been legitimating even as they have 
been vindicating legal values. They have done this implicitly in denying all 
challenges to substantive power, but they have also gone out of their way to 
explicitly defend and justify these arrangements, combining exaggerated 
security claims fed by an intense anti-prisoner rhetoric (as in Re Howard and 
Presiding Officer of the Inmate Disciplinary Court of Stony Mountain 
Institution [1985], 19 C.C.C. [3d] 195) with a romanticization of the expertise 
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and devotion to duty of administrators (Ibid., Martineau No. 2 [1979], 50 
C.C.C. [2d] 353 and Re Maltby et al andA-G Saskatchewan et al [1982], 2 
C.C.C. [2d] 153, for example) which belies a century and a half of experience. 
There has been a noticeable decline in the use of rehabilitation rhetoric to 
justify ignoring the conflicting claims of prisoners (contrast Solosky v. The 
Queen [1979], 50 C.C.C. [2d] 495, where it is still used, with Howard). Reha? 
bilitation is probably best regarded as the ideology of absolute nonintervention 
(see Mitchell, for example). The new form of selective nonintervention relies 
on a variety of abstract justifications, either in the old form of blaming the 
punishment on the prisoner (e.g., Maxie v. National Parole Board, Federal 
Court Trial Division, June 4, 1985, unreported; and Piche et al. v. Solicitor 
General of Canada et al. [1984], 17 C.C.C. 1), or in the newer form, which 
reasons from the given privations of prison to the justification of completely 
gratuitous ones (e.g., Piche: double bunking justified on general lack of 
privacy in prison; and Re Jolivet and Barker [1983], 1 D.L.R. [4th] 604: denial 
of vote justified on general lack of freedom in prison). This latter form of 
reasoning seems ideally suited to carving substantive prison issues out of the 
ambit of the Charter without diminishing its prestige in which the courts, and 
the Canadian establishment in general, have considerable stake (see Howard 
and Morin v. National SHU Committee et al., Federal Court of Appeal, May 
15,1985 unreported, for recent judicial paeans to the Charter). 
The relation of the prestige of the Charter to the prestige of the courts may 
also explain the low profile of U.S. decisions in the Canadian cases, where 
they act as facilitators to decisions not to intervene in substantive issues 
(Maltby, Collin v. Kaplan et al. [1982], 1 C.C.C. [3d] 309, and Piche citing the 
latest restrictive U.S. Supreme Court decisions on "cruel and unusual 
punishment"), but no obstacles to the enforcement of legal values (Howard on 
the right to counsel; Morin on the applicability of double jeopardy principles 
to administrative dissociation ? both going substantially beyond U.S. consti? 
tutional law in the rights recognized). 
It is worth noting, finally, that the legal values enforced by the courts (the 
right to counsel, procedural rules, and judicial review in general) directly 
promote the guild interests of lawyers. In this light, it might be possible to 
answer Jacobs' paradox of "both sides [namely prisoners and administrators] 
claiming defeat" (Jacobs, 1980: 431) in prison litigation by conceding that 
both sides may be right, with only the lawyers winning. But this would be too 
narrow a view, ignoring as it does that lawyers are first and foremost 
representatives. It is probably most helpful in this context to think of judges as 
lawyers whose clients are the status quo. To carry this just one step further, 
judges in general should not be expected to attack the status quo by turning the 
prison into a democratic institution serving popular needs any more than 
lawyers in general should be expected to attack their clients. 
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If legalization represents an expansion rather than a threat to the status quo 
of social disciplinary power, we are still left with a prison which has 
substantial differences from that described by such theorists as Foucault and 
Melossi and Pavarini. In Foucault's penitentiary, punishment is "hidden" 
(Foucault, 1977: 9); "justice is relieved of responsibility for it by a bureau? 
cratic concealment of the penalty itself which has become "non-juridical" or 
"extra-juridical" (Ibid.: 10). The prison "is not subordinated to the court...it is 
the court that is external and subordinate to the prison" (Ibid.: 308). Penal 
discipline for Foucault is "a sort of counter-law" which "undermines" the 
"universal juridicism of modern society" which "define[s] juridical subjects 
according to universal norms" (Ibid.: 223). 
Similarly, for Melossi and Pavarini the discontinuity between the juridical 
and penal spheres is absolutely central because this is what most assimilates 
the prison to the factory: 
The central contradiction of the bourgeois universe is reflected in the 
microcosm of the prison: the general juridical form which ensures a 
system of egalitarian rights is neutralized by a close-knit web of 
inegalitarian power-structures which reproduce those politico-socio? 
economic disjunctures which negate the relations formally cemented 
by the (contractual) nature of right. We thus witness the simultaneous 
existence of a right and a non- or counter-right, or indeed of con? 
tractual reason and of disciplinary necessity. The contradiction at 
this level...reflects the insoluble problem inherent in the capitalist 
mode of production itself between the sphere of distribution or 
circulation and the sphere of production or extraction of surplus 
value.... If the contract of labor formally presupposes employer and 
employee, as free subjects on equal terms, the actual work relation? 
ship necessitates the subordination of the worker to the employer. 
Similarly with the punitive relationship: "punishment as retribution" 
presupposes a free man; prison commands a "slave" (Melossi and 
Pavarini, 1981: 186). 
In the legalized prison, however, discipline can no longer be regarded as a 
"counter-law," and the autonomy and secrecy of its functioning is at least 
compromised by the courts' granting of increasing juridical status to prisoners. 
The distinction between the accused person in court and the convict in prison 
is without doubt being eroded by the court's involvement in the administration 
of the penalty. 
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Conclusion 
The prison, then, has changed. But so have the institutions of capitalism to 
which the prison has been assimilated by these theorists and by which they 
have sought to explain it. Look, for example, at the factory. Whatever practical 
similarity it bears to the factory of classical capitalism, its juridical status has 
fundamentally changed. Its internal workings are no longer the "private 
criminal code" of the individual capitalist, but are hemmed in by judicially 
recognized legality, either in the form of legislative standards for health, 
safety, minimum wages, and hours of work, or in the form of collective 
agreements governing all aspects of the relationship and enforceable in the 
courts (Marx, "The Struggle for a Normal Working Day," Vol. I, 1976: 
375-416; Kinsey, 1979; Tucker, 1984). In other words, the distinction 
between public and private spheres in general has been breaking down in late 
capitalism, a result of the centralization and concentration of capital, the pres? 
sures of the working class and the consequent involvement of the state in the 
economy. If this has resulted, as I argued earlier, in a general legalization of 
politics, we should not be surprised that this phenomenon has penetrated the 
prison or that it has no more democratized the prison than it has the factory or 
society in general. 
So, the analogy of the prison and the factory is still of great importance. 
Though the legalization of prison discipline has not changed the status quo of 
the basic power relations either for prisoners and the state (i.e., it has not 
changed the superstructural nature of the prison), or for class relations in 
general, it is probably symptomatic of changes in its precise role. It cannot be 
divorced, for example, from the whole "decarceration" phenomenon in 
Canada. This is a phenomenon of rising per capita prison populations, whose 
changing composition reflects a decreasing proportion of property offenses 
and an increasing proportion of violent offenses, which is also being greatly 
outstripped by the population under control outside the prison. This 
diminishing relative importance of the prison and the change in its precise 
function also bears striking resemblances to late capitalist developments in the 
role of the factory. 
All this suggests that Jacobs (1980: 432) is quite wrong to argue that the 
legalization of prison discipline represents a "fundamental democratization" of 
society. On the contrary, it looks a lot more like the latest in the series of 
weapons used by class society in its relentless war against democracy. 
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NOTES 
1. A similar point was made by Alison MacPhail, Senior Coordinator Legal Component in 
charge of the Solicitor-General of Canada's Correctional Law Review in a speech at the Workshop 
on Legal Values and Correctional Practice, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, 
November 9, 1985. She argued that although the direct effect of the Charter on prison life might 
be minimal, the indirect effect of granting legal rights to prisoners was to make us think of them 
"as people," which paved the way for larger changes. 
2. From 1978-79 to 1982-83, the official average daily adult prison population in Canada 
increased 22%, from 21,963 to 26,924, and the population on probation and parole increased 31%, 
from 61,738 to 80,912 (Juristat 4,5 [August, 1984]). 
REFERENCES 
Alpert, Geoffrey P. (ed.) 
1980 Legal Rights of Prisoners. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Berkman, Ronald 
1979 Opening the Gates: The Rise of the Prisoners* Movement. Lexington: D.C. 
Heath & Company. 
Bowie, Douglas 
1971 "Some Aspects of Parole in Canada." Queen's Law Journal: 127-277. 
Bronstein, Alvin J. 
1980 "Prisoners' Rights: A History." G.P. Alpert (ed.), Legal Rights of Prisoners, 
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications: 19-46. 
Canada, House of Commons 
1977 Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Subcommittee on the 
Penitentiary System in Canada, Third Report. 
Clement, Wallace 
1975 The Canadian Corporate Elite. An Analysis of Economic Power. Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart. 
Ericson, Richard V. and Patricia M. Baranek 
1982 The Ordering of Justice: A Study of Accused Persons As Dependents in the 
Criminal Justice Process. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Foucault, Michel 
1977 Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Glasbeek, HJ. and Michael Mandel 
1984 "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms." Socialist Studies 2: 84-124. 
Government of Canada 
1982 "The Criminal in Canadian Society." Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada. 
Habermas, J. 
1975 Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Hay, Douglas 
1975 "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law." Hay et al. (eds.), Albion's Fatal 
Tree: Crime and Society in 18th Century England. London: Allen Lane. 
Huff, C. Ronald 
1980 "The Discovery of Prisoners' Rights: A Sociological Analysis." Alpert (ed.), 
1980:47-65. 
Jackson, Michael 
1974 "Justice Behind the Walls ? A Study of the Disciplinary Process in a 
Canadian Penitentiary." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 12,1: 20. 
94 Mandel 
Jacobs, James B. 
1980 'The Prisoners* Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-1980." N. Morris 
and M. Tonry (eds.), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research 2: 
429-470. 
1977 Stateville: The Penitentiary in Mass Society. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Judson, John W.T. and Donald Laidlaw 
1971 
Kaiser, Gordon E. 
1971 
Kinsey, Richard 
1979 
Landau, Tammy 
1984 
Mandel, Michael 
1985 
Marx, Karl 
1976 
Melossi, D. and M. Pavarini 
"The Legal Liability of Correctional Systems.'* Queen's Law Journal: 
127-177. 
"The Inmates as Citizens: Imprisonment and the Loss of Civil Rights in 
Canada." Queen's Law Journal: 127-277. 
"Despotism and Legality." B. Fine et al. (eds.), Capitalism and the Rule of 
Law: From Deviancy Theory to Marxism. London: Hutchinson. 
"Due Process, Legalism and Inmates' Rights: A Cautionary Note." Canadian 
Criminology Forum 6: 151-163. 
"The Rule of Law and the Legalization of Politics in Canada." The 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 13: 273-287. 
Capital. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
1981 
O'Connor, J. 
1973 
O'Halloran, C.H. 
1948 
Price, R.R. 
1974 
The Prison and the Factory: Origins of the Penitentiary System. London: 
Macmillan. 
The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
"Inherent Rights." Obiter Dicta 22,1,35; 2,24; 3,21. 
"Bringing the Rule of Law to Corrections." Canadian Journal of Criminology 
and Corrections, 16: 209. 
Smith, Joan and William Fried 
1974 The Uses of the American Prison: Political Theory in Penal Practice. Toronto: 
D.C. Heath & Company: 87-101. 
Solicitor-General of Canada 
1972 
Thomas, Jim 
1984 
Thompson, E.P. 
1975 
Tucker, Eric 
1984 
Wood,E.M. 
1981 
Report of the Task Force on the Release of Inmates. 
"Law and Social Praxis: Prisoners Civil Rights to Litigation and Structural 
Mediations." Research in Law, Deviance and Social Control 6: 141-170. 
Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books Limited. 
"The Determination of Occupational Health and Safety Standards in Ontario, 
1860-1982: From the Market to Politics To.. .?'* McGill Law Journal 29: 260. 
'The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism." New Left 
Review 127:66. 
